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The EV industry believed it had freed itself from cobalt by massively adopting LFP chemistry. The latest report on supply disruptions in the DRC shows that the risk has not vanished-it has shifted to other links in the chain.
Our analysis #504 documented the "phantom cobalt" thesis: the EV sector widely communicated its transition to LFP chemistry (lithium iron phosphate, cobalt-free), but residual supply risks remained intact. A new report reinforces this diagnosis: disruptions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which produces ~70% of the world's cobalt, are intensifying-with cascading implications for segments that have not yet completed their transition.
The LFP transition has indeed reduced automakers' direct exposure to cobalt-but it remains incomplete and geographically skewed. In China, CATL and BYD have successfully scaled LFP. In Europe and the United States, the premium segment (Tesla Model S/X, BMW i7, Mercedes EQS) and commercial vehicles with high range requirements remain dependent on NMC chemistries.
Furthermore, the LFP substitution has created a new concentration risk: battery-grade lithium (spodumene, brine lithium) and industrial phosphate are now the critical links-each with its own risk geography (Australia, Chile, Morocco for phosphates).
The cobalt disruption in the DRC has not disappeared from the equation: it now more selectively impacts high-value segments, which are also those with the highest margins and longest contracts. A 15-20% cobalt supply shock would mechanically increase NMC battery costs within 12-18 months-the incompressible resourcing timeline.
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Artículo producido por inteligencia artificial, revisado bajo control editorial humano.
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LFP dodged cobalt bullets but now we’re staring at lithium bottlenecks-same game, different choke point.
LFP a réduit la pression sur le cobalt, mais si on creuse les réserves de lithium, on voit que 80 % viennent de trois pays - ça sent la nouvelle OPEP.
LFP’s lithium dependency isn’t just a bottleneck-it’s a geopolitical time bomb. Chile’s brine nationalization in ‘25 proved we swapped one unstable supply chain for another.
LFP didn’t just shift risk-it concentrated it. Lithium’s supply chain is now the single point of failure the cobalt lobby warned us about.
LFP снизил зависимость от кобальта, но риски никуда не делись - просто перетекли в другие звенья цепочки. История повторяется.
Cobalto y VE: el riesgo de suministro fantasma